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HERBERT WECHSLER'S COMPLAINT AND THE REVIVAL
OF GRAND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Keith E. Whittington*
In 1988, Mark Tushnet noted the "revival of grand theory in
constitutional law."1 Tushnet was somewhat unusual in specifying
the object of contemporary constitutional theory so precisely. As he
noted, what had been .revived in the late twentieth century was an
"interest in comprehensive normative theories of constitutional
law."2  There was relatively little broad concern with
constitutionalism in this revival, but quite a lot of concern with
justifying and elaborating the preferred constitutional decisions of
the Supreme Court in specific cases.3 Having "just published a book
on constitutional theory that I unsurprisingly but undoubtedly
erroneously regard as the last word on the subject," Tushnet
pronounced it time "to start doing something else."4 Just over a
decade later, Tushnet has returned to constitutional theory with
another book, but fortunately he has still produced "something else."
Rather than offering yet another comprehensive normative theory
of constitutional law, Tushnet has engaged a different, grander
tradition of constitutional theory that is more concerned with
governmental systems and political authority than with judicial
doctrine. His contribution to the revival of this tradition of grand
constitutional theory is most welcome.
This new effort, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts,5
is a welcome relief from the usual project of praising or denouncing
the constitutional law produced by the Warren, Burger, and
Rehnquist Courts. The basic questions it asks-who should interpret
the Constitution and what would be the consequences of sharply
curtailing judicial review'-are radically different than the usual
questions that law professors ask and that have dominated recent
* Assistant Professor of Politics, Princeton University.
1. MARKV. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE, AND BLUE: ACRITICALANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 1 (1988).
2. Id.
3. See id. at 1-2.
4. Mark V. Tushnet, Constitutional Scholarship: What's Next?, 5 CONST. COMENTARY
28, 32 (1988).
5. MARK TUsHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999).
6. See id. at x-xii.
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constitutional theory. As a political scientist, I must admit that I
found Tushnet's questions to be quite congenial, even when I
disagreed with his particular arguments and conclusions. Main-
stream constitutional theory has not generally asked such ques-
tions. Instead, it has been a deeply partisan enterprise and not only
in the usual sense of the term. Constitutional theorists have been
committed to looking over the shoulders of the Justices, "looking out
and down from the perspective of [their] place."7 Their problems
have been the Justices' problems-how to interpret the Constitution
and how to maintain judicial legitimacy.
To be sure, Tushnet's current effort still reflects the brooding
presence of the Supreme Court. Congressional passage of the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 19938 ensured that the Court
would soon have to address the problem of who authoritatively
interprets the Constitution, and the Court did not disappoint with
its ardent assertion of judicial supremacy in City of Boerne v.
Flores.' The problem of judicial supremacy ceased to be a matter of
historical and theoretical interest and became a present issue in
constitutional law.
The conservative Rehnquist Court is itself inherently disruptive
to mainstream constitutional theory, encouraging a change in
focus.' ° As Tushnet observed in 1988, constitutional theory "ha[d]
been living off the remains of the Warren Court."" The Warren
Court was activist and deferential in all the right places-expanding
civil liberties while legitimating the nationalization and centraliza-
tion of political decision-making. 2 The substantive commitments of
the Warren Court and legal academics were in synch. But the
Warren Court has been gone a long time, and the Rehnquist Court
follows a different program. The Rehnquist Court seems unlikely to
heed the recommendations of academic constitutional theorists, and
its reduced caseload and more compromised rulings have encour-
7. RicHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS at xxi
(1990).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
9. 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993
was unconstitutional).
10. See Sanford Levinson, The Audience for Constitutional Meta-Theory (or, Why and to
Whom, Do I Write the Things IDo?), 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 389,403-07 (1992).
11. Tushnet, supra note 4, at 28.
12. See id. at 28-29.
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aged even law professors to reconsider whether the Court stands at
the center of the political universe. Moreover, the Court seems to
have become activist in areas such as federalism, about which
traditional constitutional theory has relatively little to say. The time
may be ripe for legal academics to become interested in the question
of whether the Constitution should be taken away from the Court.
It is at least fitting that Tushnet, the great student of Thurgood
Marshall, should be asking whether the Constitution ought to be
taken away from this Court.
The specter of the Court hangs over this book in another way as
well. When considering what should be next for constitutional
theory in the late 1980s, Tushnet noted that one possibility was for
constitutional theory to "turn away from its obsession with the
Supreme Court.""3 But, he added, "I think this is unlikely and
perhaps even unwise."14 Tushnet may have overcome his fears of
turning away from the Court by keeping one hand on the old and
familiar. Judicial cases, legal problems, and legal arguments are
prominent throughout the book and help structure the discussion.
At the same time, however, Tushnet broadens the types of questions
that constitutional theory should be asking and expands the types
of considerations, evidence, and scholarship that will be necessary
to address adequately those questions. Ultimately, the comparative
institutional analysis for which he calls should engage a wide range
of scholars from a number of disciplines. Hopefully, those ranks will
include law professors. It should be an agenda-setting book, as well.
This is an interesting and valuable book, filled with insights and
thought-provoking discussions.
In this article, I want to suggest some of the ways in which this
book challenges constitutional theory to move in a new direction. In
the first section, I review some of the themes that I take to be
characteristic features of constitutional theory over the past four
decades. In the second section, I discuss several ways that Tushnet
breaks from those traditional themes. In the third section, I briefly
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I. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AFTER WECHSLER
Contemporary constitutional theory has fairly specific origins
from the late 1950s. Those origins also marked it with a fairly
specific set of concerns raised most directly by the Court's decision
in Brown v. Board of Education.5 Brown posed basic problems to
two cherished commitments of constitutional scholarship in the
1950s. The first commitment was political and reflected the New
Deal's triumph over the Lochner Court.'6 Having struggled with
decades of judicial intransigence to liberal reform and progressive
legislation, the New Dealers were sharp critics ofjudicial activism. 7
The New Dealers portrayed their difficulties with the Court as a
clear conflict between "democracy" and "nine old men."" There was
a "basic inconsistency between popular government and judicial
supremacy" that raised troubling problems of legitimacy for the
Court.'9 The course of the struggle between the Roosevelt adminis-
tration and the Court also taught an important political lesson-an
activist judiciary is vulnerable to political attack.2 ° The near success
of the Court-packing plan emphasized the vulnerability of the Court.
Political and popular tolerance of the Court was limited; judicial
legitimacy was fragile.2' An incautious Court could lose its inde-
pendence.
The second commitment of constitutional scholars in the postwar
period was jurisprudential, though this too was influenced by the
New Deal experience. An essential feature of the law and the
judicial articulation of the law was sound reasoning.22 An important
function of the courts was to be principled and reasonable. More-
over, this professional and institutional obligation on the part of the
courts was also essential to its legitimacy.23 In the postwar period,
the law needed to be reconstructed in response not only to the
15. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
16. The Court derived this name from its decision in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905), and other decisions it made in that time period.
17. See generally ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY (1941).
18. DREw PEARSON & ROBERT S. ALLEN, THE NINE OLD MEN (1936) (providing a
journalistic account of the Court that popularized the view that the Justices were old men out
of touch with the times).
19. JACKSON, supra note 17, at vii.
20. See id. at 323-24 ("By impairing its own prestige through risking it in the field of
policy, it may impair its ability to defend our liberties.").
21. See id. atxdx.
22. See NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 258-59 (1995).
23. See id. at 258-60.
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challenge of the Legal Realists, but also to the challenge of the New
Deal's rejection of decades of constitutional law precedent. For
postwar constitutional scholars, the answer could be found in the
Lochner Court's substitution of politics for principle. The Roosevelt
administration mounted an attack on "an abuse of power, not on the
institution itself."24
Constitutional theory was given its modern form by Herbert
Wechsler's complaint about Brown." Wechsler articulated the basic
challenge that Brown represented to this post-New Deal scholarly
consensus; consequently, constitutional theory has been struggling
to accommodate decisions like Brown within that framework ever
since. In essence, modern constitutional theory was driven by
Wechsler's professional complaint that the Court in Brown did not
adequately adhere to norms of principled justification when
explaining its decision.2 1 Stephen Griffin called the style of constitu-
tional theory at mid-century "the learned tradition," centrally
concerned with "proper craftsmanship."28 Constitutional theorists
provided the "descriptive-explanatory and evaluative-prescriptive"
framework that could be used to guide and critique the Court's
constitutional efforts, while justifting the Court's role in exercising
the power of judicial review.
Wechsler defined the theoretical agenda with his 1959 Holmes
Lecture at Harvard Law School.3" In the 1958 Holmes Lecture,
Judge Learned Hand, arguing that only a sharply restrained Court
could avoid becoming "a third legislative chamber," threw down the
gauntlet to defenders of the Court.3 ' Picking up that gauntlet,
Wechsler defined the task of constitutional theory as explaining how
an activist judiciary could function as "courts of law" rather than "as
a naked power organ."32 This distinction has a long pedigree in
American constitutional thought, dating back to Alexander Hamil-
ton and John Marshall. It periodically comes under siege, however,
24. JACKSON, supra note 17, at xiii.
25. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARv.L.
REV. 1 (1959) (arguing that courts have the power and duty to decide all constitutional cases
where jurisdictional and procedural requirements are met).
26. See id. at 22-24.
27. See id.
28. Stephen M. Griffin, What Is Constitutional Theory? The Newer Theory and the Decline
of the Learned Tradition, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 493, 498 (1989).
29. Id.
30. See Wechsler, supra note 25, at 1.
31. LEARNED HAND, THE BIL OF RIGHTs 55 (1958).
32. Wechsler, supra note 25, at 12.
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as it did from the Legal Realists.33 Although critical of Hand's
conclusions favoring a fairly radical judicial restraint, Wechsler was
similarly concerned that the Supreme Court was abandoning its
legitimate role and risking the "misuse of judicial power."34 Even
before the Brown case was argued and decided, Wechsler voiced
similar concerns about the inadequate constitutional reasoning of
the desegregationists in an NAACP strategy session.35 Desegrega-
tion was an admirable political goal, but Wechsler did not see how
it could be achieved by the Court's employment of traditional legal
tools. 36
Not all constitutional scholars agreed with Wechsler's complaint
about the Court's action and reasoning in cases like Brown.37
Nonetheless, Wechsler's concern was grounded in widespread post-
New Deal understandings about the role of the judiciary in the
American constitutional system.3' His articulation of those themes
was decisive in shaping contemporary constitutional theory. An
activist judiciary created real intellectual problems for those of
Wechsler's generation, given the centrality of their opposition to the
Lochner Court to their political experience. 39 Being substantively
more sympathetic to the actions of the Warren Court, the emerging
constitutional theory revolved around the effort to legitimate
activist judicial review. The Warren Court tended to define the
experience of a subsequent generation of constitutional scholars,
who unsurprisingly were more confident in their efforts to justify
33. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803); THE FEDERALISTNo. 78
(Alexander Hamilton); see also SILVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 109-75 (1990); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL
CHANGE 53-60, 196-200 (1988).
34. Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward 'Neutral Principles"in the Law: Selections
from the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 U. COLO. L. REV. 854, 929 (1993).
35. See, e.g., RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROwN v. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 529-30 (1975).
36. See Wechsler, supra note 25, at 27-33.
37. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE
L.J. 421 (1960); Charles E. Clark, A Plea for the Unprincipled Decision, 49 VA. L. REV. 660
(1963); Jan G. Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REV. 169 (1968); Eugene V. Rostow,American
Legal Realism and the Sense of the Profession, 34 ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 123 (1962); Benjamin
F. Wright, The Supreme Court Cannot Be Neutral, 40 TEX. L. REV. 599 (1962).
38. See Silber & Miller, supra note 34, at 925 (claiming that there was "nothing novel" in
Wechsler's core theory).
39. See id. at 924 ("Having learned through that experience of the consequences ofludicial
excess, we became highly sensitive to it, and on the whole, I should say, eager to develop the
type of critique that would contribute to avoiding it.").
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judicial review and more specific in their efforts to guide judicial
doctrine.4 °
The purpose of post-Wechslerian constitutional theory is "to
develop a generally accepted theory to guide the interpretation of
the Constitution of the United States" by the federal judiciary.41
Constitutional theorists "refine the raw materials" of judicial
opinions, seeking to "develop justificatory theories that provide a
more comprehensive account of the judges' actions than the judges
themselves could offer."42 This goal has severely limited the scope of
the theoretical enterprise. Judge Learned Hand's critique ofjudicial
review was not integrated into constitutional theory; it was the
rationale for theorizing. Constitutional theorists have been advo-
cates for their preferred judicial doctrines, for their preferred
judicial opinions, and for the institution ofjudicial review itself. For
some, defending the institution of judicial review required limiting
its scope, as Alexander Bickel and Robert Bork have argued.43 For
many others, the purpose of defending judicial review was to expand
its scope.44 In either case, the Court and its work were not merely at
the center of the scholarly enterprise, but defined its very purpose.
As Wechsler later explained, his article "was a defense of judicial
review,"45 and as he noted at its beginning, "I have not the slightest
doubt about the legitimacy of judicial review."4" The question is
simply how that power should be exercised.
Wechsler's specific argument defending the Court also became a
dominant theme of contemporary constitutional theory. Principled
reasoning, according to much of contemporary constitutional theory,
is the exclusive preserve of the courts. Wechsler himself asserted
that "no one will deny, that principles are largely instrumental as
they are employed in politics, instrumental in relation to results
40. See Martin Shapiro, Fathers and Sons: The Court, the Commentators, and the Search
for Values, in THE BURGER COURT 218-23, 236-38 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983).
41. Richard A. Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998).
42. Mark V. Tushnet, Judges and Constitutional Theory: A View from History, 63 U.
COLO. L. REv. 425, 426 (1992).
43. See ALEXANDERM. BICKEL, THE LEASTDANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURTAT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 111-98 (1962) Lereinafter BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH];
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 173-81 (1970);
ROBERT H. BORiK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 139-60, 241-65 (1990).
44. See, e.g., RONALD M. DWOREIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 261-347 (1996).
45. Silber & Miller, supra note 34, at 931.
46. Wechsler, supra note 25, at 2.
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that a controlling sentiment demands at any given time."47 Princi-
ples are "reduced to a manipulative tool" in politics.4" By contrast,
"the main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must
be genuinely principled."49 Henry Hart lauded the Court as "a voice
of reason" among American political institutions, and Alexander
Bickel similarly thought that, whereas legislatures were motivated
by mere expediency, the Court provided what the political system
otherwise lacked-principled reasoning."° Ronald Dworkin, perhaps
the leading current proponent of this view, asserted that the Court
is a unique "institution that calls some issues from the battleground
of power politics to the forum of principle."5'
It is worth calling attention to three separate features of this
argument. First, it assumes the Court does in fact engage in
principled reasoning. Wechsler himself was somewhat ambiguous
about the nature of his claim, sometimes suggesting that reasoned
elaboration of the basis for decisions was normatively important for
courts and sometimes suggesting that it was descriptively central to
the judicial process.52 That tension has been retained in constitu-
tional theory, which continues to assert a desire to "explain the
evolving content of constitutional law" in terms of principled
reasoning. 3 Second, it assumes that other political actors do not
engage in principled reasoning. The elected branches of government
are understood to be disinterested in and incapable of reasoning
about constitutional meaning. As Owen Fiss asserted most directly,
legislatures "are not ideologically committed or institutionally suited
to search for the meaning of constitutional values, but instead see
their primary function in terms of registering the actual, occurrent
preference of the people-what they want and what they believe
should be done."54 Similarly, Dworkin has dismissed legislatures as
concerned with issues of political power alone rather than with
47. Id. at 14.
48. Id. at 15.
49. Id.
50. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Time Chart of the Justices-Foreword, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84,
99 (1959); BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, supra note 43, at 58.
51. RONALD M. DWORK-N, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 71 (1985).
52. See Wechsler, supra note 25, at 19; see also DUXBURY, supra note 22, at 269-70.
53. Terrance Sandalow, Judicial Protections of Minorities, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1162, 1165
(1977); see also STEPHEN M. GRIFFiN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 156-58 (1996); Michael
C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original
Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1767 (1997).
54. Owen Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 10 (1980).
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issues of principle.55 Third, it is understood that constitutionalism
is centrally about matters of principled reasoning, morality, and
justice. Constitutions are about removing some decisions of principle
from the hands of political majorities who merely seek to assert
their will.56 The value of judicial reasoning is that it converts
questions of naked power and occurrent preferences into questions
of justice.57 Dworkin concludes that some might "call that religion
or prophecy," but he "call[s] it law."" Wechsler would have under-
stood.
II. THE OTHER GRAND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
Tushnet's book breaks from the Wechslerian theoretical project.
In doing so, it joins a rather different tradition of grand constitu-
tional theorizing that has deeper historical roots and broader
political aspirations. In this book, Tushnet does not offer yet another
defense of Brown59 and Roe,6" and he does not ask us to ponder how
the Court should decide its next set of constitutional cases, nor what
might be a better rationale for the Court's recent decisions. The book
does not ask that most basic of legal questions-what does this
Constitution mean?-nor does it develop an interpretive theory that
would tell us how to answer that question. This is not a book of
constitutional interpretation.6
A second tradition of grand constitutional theorizing has operated
alongside the Wechslerian tradition. Unlike theory in the
Wechslerian vein, this second theoretical tradition has not concen-
trated on constitutional law.62 Instead of interpreting this Constitu-
55. See DwORKIN, supra note 51, at 70.
56. See id. at 69-70; see also Paul W. Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American
Constitutionalism, 98 YALE L.J. 449 (1989).
57. See Wechsler, supra note 25, at 12; see also DWORKIN, supra note 51, at 71; Fiss, supra
note 54, at 10.
58. DWORKIN, supra note 51, at 71.
59. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
60. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 959 (1973).
61. Cf. Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1984) ("We
are all interpretivists; the real arguments are not over whether judges should stick to
interpreting, but over what they should interpret and what interpretive attitudes they should
adopt.").
62. The broader approach to constitutional theory has been maintained in a variety of
scholarly communities, from the British jurisprudential school, to the "Princeton school" of
constitutional studies nurtured by Walter Murphy, to the Political Economy for a Good
Society group, to the "constitutional political economy" ofpublic-choice scholars. See generally
20001
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tion, this second tradition has been concerned with broad
constitutionalism." It has asked how constitutions work, how they
are maintained over time, and what the conditions of their success
are.64 This theoretical tradition has deep roots in political philoso-
phy and political practice, and it includes the efforts of the American
Founders themselves. More recent scholarly efforts in this mode
have largely, though not entirely, occurred outside the law schools.
1. From "How to Interpret?" to "Who Interprets?""
Tushnet departs from the mainstream of contemporary constitu-
tional theory in a number of ways. He begins his book by shifting
the basic question of his constitutional theory from how to interpret
the Constitution to who should interpret the Constitution. 7 This
question has gained new currency as a result of the high profile
congressional challenge to the Court's interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause" and the Court's subsequent rejection of this
legislative challenge to judicial supremacy.69 The Boerne Court,
quoting Marshall, argued that "if Congress could define its own
powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer
would the Constitution be 'superior paramount law, unchangeable
by ordinary means.' It would be 'on a level with ordinary legislative
acts, and, like other acts.., alterable when the legislature shall
please to alter it."'7 ° Not surprisingly, the Court concluded, "Under
this approach, it is difficult to conceive of a principle that would
limit congressional power."7' The Court begged the question,
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES (Sotirios A. Barber & Robert P.
George, eds., forthcoming) (on file with author); A NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM: DESIGNING
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS FORAGOOD SOCIETY( Stephen L. Elkin & Karol Edward Soltan, eds.,
1993); CHARLES K. ROWLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY IN A PUBLIC CHOICE
PERSPECTIVE (1997).
63. See discussion supra note 62.
64. See discussion supra note 62.
65. See discussion supra note 62.
66. Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional
Interpreter, 48 REV. OFPOL. 401,403-06 (1986); see also WALTERF. MURPHYETAL., AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 14-19 (2d ed. 1995).
67. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at ix-xii.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
69. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV.L. REV. 1359,1371 (1997); Symposium, Reflections on CityofBoerne
v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 601 (1998).
70. City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,529 (1997) (quotingMarburyv. Madison, 5 U.S.




however, of whether congressional interpretation of its constitution-
ally delegated powers is equivalent to congressional alteration of
those powers and of constitutional meaning. Certainly, the Court
would deny that its own interpretive efforts amount to "altering the
Fourteenth Amendment's meaning,"72 though outside observers,
including many in Congress, may be inclined to disagree.
The prospect of constitutionalism outside the courts has attracted
increasing attention from constitutional theorists over the past
several years. Paul Brest and Sanford Levinson have long encour-
aged constitutional theorists to look beyond the courts. 3 Bruce
Ackerman's expansive We the People project has developed a theory
of constitutional politics that supplements the written Constitution
with unconventional amendments to be interpreted by the Court.74
Rather differently, Cass Sunstein has called for a judicial
minimalism that would leave room for constitutional deliberation
outside the courtroom." Such works tend to remain centrally
interested, however, in the old questions of judicial legitimacy, the
degree of deference the Court should show elected officials, and
court-centered constitutional interpretation. The Reagan administra-
tion's criticisms of the Court and judicial supremacy sparked some
interest in the problem of judicial authority and the President's
independent constitutional responsibilities.76 Boerne may help push
constitutional theorists to engage in further fundamental consider-
ations of who should, and does, interpret the Constitution.77
In recent years, the problem ofjudicial supremacy and who should
interpret the Constitution was posed most directly and forcefully by
Walter Murphy and a cluster of constitutional scholars loosely
associated with Princeton University.3 Murphy himself emphasized
that the question of who should interpret the Constitution has been
a persistent one in American political history and is theoretically
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., PAULBRESTETAL.,PROCESSESOFCONSTrrUTIONALDEISIONMAING (2000);
Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 585 (1975); Sanford Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979
Sup. CT. REv. 123 (1980).
74. See 1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFOR ATIONS (1998).
75. See CASS R. SUNsTEIN, ONE CASE ATATIME: JUDICIAL MINIALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT 3-72 (1999); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 145-53 (1993).
76. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 906
(1990); Edwin Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 984-88 (1987).
77. See generally City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
78. See generally CONSTITUTIONALTHEORYAND CONSTITUTIONALSTUDIES, supra note 62.
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distinct from the more commonly asked question of how it should be
interpreted.79 Wechslerian constitutional theory did not bother to
pose the question of who should interpret. Its starting point was the
assertion that the Court was the special guardian of the Constitu-
tion and that, if the judiciary did not take care to interpret the
Constitution, then no one else would.8" A number of scholars have
been skeptical of that claim.8 ' Political actors outside the courts
often took the Constitution seriously and offered their own inde-
pendent interpretations of it. 2 Moreover, they often challenged the
supremacy of the judiciary by choosing among competing interpreta-
tions of the constitutional text. In the midst of the New Deal
debates about the scope of judicial authority over the Constitution,
the great Princeton constitutional scholar Edward Corwin labeled
this alternative conception of constitutional interpretation
departmentalism, in which each branch of government has equal
authority to interpret the Constitution.84 He traced its pedigree back
to Thomas Jefferson and noted both its formal logic and its histori-
cal persistence. Sanford Levinson's notion of constitutional
Protestantism further broadens interpretive authority beyond
government institutions to individuals.86
Notably, the theoretical challenge to judicial supremacy makes it
possible to move the Constitution beyond the control of a judicial
elite. Tushnet exploits that opportunity in his call for a populist
constitutional law. His constitutional populism is not simply a
79. See Murphy, supra note 66, at 410-17.
80. See Wechsler, supra note 25, at 3.
81. See generally SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY (1992);
JOHN J. DNAN, KEEPING THE PEOPLE'S LIBERTIES: LEGISLATORS, CITIZENS, AND JUDGES AS
GUARDIANS OFRIGHTS (1998); GRIFFIN, supra note 53; DONALD MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1966); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED
POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Interpretation
by Members of Congress, 63 N.C. L. REV. 707 (1985); Mark A. Graber, Delegalizing
Constitutional Theory, 6 THE GOOD SOCIETY 47 (1996).
82. See generally NEAL DEVINS, SHAPING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES (1996); DINAN, supra
note 81; LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES (1988); MORGAN, supra note 81;
WHITTINGTON, supra note 81; Fisher, supra note 81.
83. See Scott E. Gant, Judicial Supremacy and Nonjudicial Interpretation of the
Constitution, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 359,366-89 (1997); Murphy, supra note 66, at 410-12;
Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law
Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 221 (1994).
84. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 4-7 (1938).
85. See id. at 7, 69-70.
86. See Levinson, supra note 73, at 137-48.
87. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at x-xi.
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metaphor for how the Court should interpret the Constitution.8 8 His
point is not that the Court should take the people seriously as a
source of or audience for constitutional law, but that the people have
the right to seize control of constitutional interpretation and engage
directly in a constructive constitutional project.89 Wechslerian
constitutional theory tended to be fairly skeptical of the preferences
and moral opinions of the people and the threat that they posed to
judicially understood constitutional law.9" Tushnet insists that we
question the authority of the Court to control the terms of constitu-
tional debate.9'
Importantly, Tushnet emphasizes that political actors will engage
in a substantively different process of realizing constitutional values
than that which characterizes judicial proceedings.92 In discussing
the Senate debates over the confirmation of Judge Robert Bork's
nomination to the Supreme Court, Tushnet notes that Bork and the
senators "were discussing the Constitution in front of the American
people." 3 In doing so, "they were constructing the First Amendment
for public edification, not construing it. To criticize them for
misunderstanding the Court's doctrine is itself to misunderstand
the activity in which they were engaged."94 In form, substance, and
purpose, constitutionalism outside the courts is unlikely to resemble
constitutionalism inside the courts. The existing apparatus of
constitutional theory cannot simply be transferred from the
courtroom to the legislature and be employed as before. A new type
of theory will be necessary to advance our understanding of
nonjudicial constitutionalism.
B. Taking Judicial Review Seriously
Wechslerian constitutional theory began with the rejection of
Judge Learned Hand's radical challenge to judicial review. Although
88. Cf. RicHARDi D. PARKER, HERE, THE PEOPLE RuLE 108-09 (1994) ("The Populist
solution to the problem, I believe, is to deflate constitutional discourse, to deflate its
pretension to argue about, and in the name of, 'higher' law.").
89. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 181-94.
90. See DWORKIN, supra note 51, at 69; Fiss, supra note 54, at 10.
91. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 6-32.
92. See id. at 51-71. Perhaps fortuitously, I have also emphasized the political
construction of constitutional meaning as a distinct activity from the judicial interpretation
of the text.
93. Id. at 64.
94. Id.; see WHITrINGTON, supra note 81, at 1-19.
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Tushnet's argumentative substance and tone are different than
Hand's, he reopens the questions asked by Hand and insists that the
basic legitimacy and desirability of judicial review not be taken for
granted.95 I must admit that I find Tushnet's critique of judicial
review somewhat unfortunate in the context of this book. Tushnet
begins the book with the problem of judicial supremacy and that
issue occupies most of its pages.96 Tushnet's analysis of the problems
ofjudicial supremacy is sophisticated and useful; the linkage of that
analysis with his ultimate rejection ofjudicial review itself is likely
to diminish the influence of his earlier arguments.97 Critics of
judicial supremacy have often been dismissed as enemies ofjudicial
review, and Tushnet may feed that inclination by exposing
departmentalism's secret agenda. In his review of the book, for
example, Judge Richard Posner makes no distinction between the
two parts of Tushnet's analysis, and simply regards the whole book
as an "interesting heresy" that is "quixotic" in its "attacks on judicial
review."9 Judicial supremacy and judicial review are related but
nonetheless distinct constitutional concepts, and they must
ultimately be judged on their own independent merits and receive
separate hearings.
Having said that, Tushnet's radical critique of judicial review is
a valuable one. I will leave aside for now a particular consideration
of whether Tushnet might actually be right in his attack on judicial
review.99 If he is, then the value of the critique would be self-
evident. At the very least, it is useful to have those debates now and
again. Tushnet's work, along with the rather different work of the
political theorist Jeremy Waldron,' ° should at least shake us from
our intellectual complacency and force us to develop more careful
and compelling defenses of judicial review. Tushnet forces us to
rethink judicial review and American constitutional practice from
the ground up,1 ' and we might well find a number of problems with
the existing edifice as we proceed with the examination. The
institution that we decide is defensible may bear little resemblance
to the institution with which we live today.
95. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 129-53 (assessing judicial review).
96. See, e.g., id. at 6-32 (discussing theories opposed to judicial supremacy).
97. See id.
98. Richard A. Posner, Appeal and Consent, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 16, 1999, at 36
(reviewing MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999)).
99. See discussion and notes infra Part III.
100. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
101. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 154-76.
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The critique is also a valuable one because it helps break the
institutional bias of Wechslerian constitutional theory. °2 That
institutional bias has had numerous baneful consequences for
constitutional theory. It has limited the scope of the questions that
scholars have been willing to pursue and contributed to their
obsession with legal advocacy for favored constitutional doctrines.
The problems of the Court become the problems of constitutional
theory. As a consequence, the theoretical debate congregates at the
margins of current judicial practice. Substantive constitutional
issues or positions that are unlikely to be heard or adopted by the
Court are left underexamined. Adopting the perspective of the Court
encourages the theorist to embrace judicial power and expand the
scope ofjudicial review. All of our theoretical sympathies are aligned
with one institutional actor, at the expense of others.
Beyond the normative implications of such institutional partisan-
ship, the judicial perspective also limits our capacity to understand
our historical constitutional practice. Scholarship is biased toward
those subjects that might prove useful for the judiciary.' °3 As a
consequence, constitutional theory tends to privilege texts over
political practice, legally significant historical periods over other
periods of American history, and theories of constitutional interpre-
tation over theories of constitutional operation. Breaking free from
the judicial perspective may serve to expand the constitutional
canon and open up new areas of scholarly inquiry.'
Tushnet's willingness to reconsider the foundations of judicial
review also opens the possibility of a more objective examination of
the judiciary itself and of more serious comparative institutional
analysis. Constitutional theory has relied on a highly idealized
vision of the Court-rational, noble, and omnipotent. Tushnet quite
rightly insists that we take the actual practice of judicial review
more seriously before we build our lofty theoretical fabrications on
top of it.'0 5 As political scientists have long argued, Tushnet points
102. See discussion and notes supra Part I.
103. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Commentary: The Canons of Constitutional
Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 963, 1016 (1998) (arguing that casebooks' "willful ignorance of
nonjudicial interpreters" causes law students to "end up believing that constitutional
interpretation is the exclusive province of the judiciary").
104. See id. at 1014-18.
105. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 154-76 (arguing against judicial review).
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out that the Court is a political institution.' °6 It is political not only
in the types of questions it must answer, but also in the types of
answers it provides.' °7 It is political in that the Justices are not
sealed off from their outside environment. Rather, the Court often
reflects the interests and opinions of those who occupy political
power in the other branches of government. As Robert Dahl long ago
observed, the Court is more likely to be a partner with the rest of
the national government than its watchdog.'O Even if the Court was
inclined to resist the concerted efforts of other powerful political
actors, it is far from certain that it would have the institutional
capacity to succeed. 10 9 Tushnet overstates the case in concluding
that "judicial review basically amounts to noise around zero"" 0 and
that "vigorous judicial review does not make much difference one
way or the other,""' but his skepticism of the ultimate value of
judicial review is certainly warranted.
Constitutional theory has too often relied on a rosy picture of the
judiciary and on images of the legislature that are not valued for
any particular descriptive verisimilitude." 2 Surely normative
constitutional theory should take greater account of what we know
about how government institutions actually operate. This will
require some adjustments in what legal academics regard as
"relevant" scholarship." 3 There is little point to incorporating better
understandings ofjudicial behavior into constitutional theory if the
intended audience is primarily composed of judges looking for well-
106. For recent overviews, see, for example, SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAIKING: NEW
INSTITUTIONALISTAPPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999), and THE
SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (Cornell
Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999).
107. Cf. Wechsler, supra note 25, at 15. Wechsler notes that
courts in constitutional determinations face issues that are inescapably
"political"... in that they involve a choice among competing values or desires,
a choice reflected in the legislative or executive action in question, which the
court must either condemn or condone.... But what is crucial, I submit, is not
the nature of the answer that may validly be given by the courts.
Id.
108. See Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 293 (1957) ("The Supreme Court is not, however,
simply an agent of the alliance. It is an essential part of the political leadership .... ").
109. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SoCIAL CHANGE? 10-21 (1991).
110. TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 153.
111. Id. at 174.
112. See WALDRON, supra note 100, at 31-32.
113. See Symposium, Ira C. Rothberger, Jr. Conference on Constitutional Law:
Constitutional Theory and the Practice of Judging, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 291 (1992).
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argued legal briefs. Legal advocacy may well improve if it is
grounded on an appropriate appreciation of the nature and limits of
judicial decision-making, but the more central point is that it is high
time for those who hope to understand the Constitution to move
beyond what Woodrow Wilson denounced as "literary theory."14 Not
only is normative argument likely to be ineffective if too abstracted
from political reality, but it is also likely to be bad normative
argument.
The Wechslerian defense of judicial review, and of subsequent
defenses of activist judicial review, is grounded in a particular
image of the political branches as venal, unprincipled, and small-
minded.115 If that portrait proves to be flawed, then the dominant
assumptions about when and why judicial review should be
exercised are wrong. Constitutional theory has built elaborate
castles in the air. Tushnet is at least proposing that we build our
theories on firmer foundations. Constitutional theory in the future
should have far more empirical and political analysis than it
generally does at present.
C. Beyond Moral and Legal Theory1
6
Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts is a ready response
to Chief Judge Richard Posner's complaint that constitutional
theory has given over to moral philosophizing." ' Like most contem-
porary constitutional theory, this work is normative in its goals.
Tushnet is concerned with mounting a serious critique of judicial
review and arguing for the positive virtues of a constitutional
regime without judicial review.
Beyond the radical particulars of Tushnet's conclusion, however,
his argument is distinguished by its emphasis on the institutional
rather than the legal. His concern is strictly with the scope of
judicial review rather than with the particular use of judicial
review. Moreover, his interest in judicial review does not primarily
hinge on its substantive outcomes, at least not in the usual sense.
114. See WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN
POLITcs 31 (1st ed. 1956).
115. See supra notes 41-58 and accompanying text.
116. See Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1637 (1998).
117. See id. at 1638.
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He criticizes the Court for its effects on the political system as a
whole, rather than for reaching bad results in the cases it decides.
The particular direction of the Court's decisions is less important
than the fact that it distracts other political actors from their own
constitutional responsibilities."'
Unlike many critics of the Court, Tushnet is not frightened by the
possibility ofjudicial tyranny. As Alexander Hamilton observed, the
Court is simply too weak to be much of a threat to the type of
preferred political order Tushnet advances." 9 At the same time, it
is too weak to be much of an asset in bringing about that ideal order
as well. Tushnet grounds his critique less in the moral culpability
of the Court than in its political inadequacy. Moral philosophy is
less useful in building such a case than is political science. Tush-
net's argument is grounded in a positive normative vision, but the
structure of the argument is morally thin.
Moral philosophy comes most directly into play in the book
through Tushnet's argument in favor of a "thin Constitution." 2 °
Tushnet draws a contrast between the "thick Constitution" that
provides the structural details of government and the various
specific rules governing political behavior 12' and the "thin Constitu-
tion" that is rooted in the principles of the Declaration of Independ-
ence and sets out the great, and abstract, principles of liberty and
self-governance.'22 The American political system is valuable to the
extent that it adheres to the thin Constitution, not to the thick.
2 3
The thick Constitution simply provides the messy, pragmatic,
mutable details that help realize the goals of the thin Constitu-
tion. 24 It is the thin Constitution that Tushnet wants to defend and
that provides the basis of his populist constitutional law. 125 Some-
what surprisingly, however, Tushnet has little of substance to say
about the thin Constitution. The thin Constitution remains
extremely thin in Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts.
The Constitution Tushnet wants to defend, and thinks Americans
118. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 6-32 (arguing against judicial supremacy).
119. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 33.
120. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 9-14.
121. See id. at 9.
122. See id. at 11.
123. See id. at 14.
124. See id. at 9.
125. See id. at 13.
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generally want to defend,126 seems to consist of little more than a
few rhetorical slogans.
In keeping with the theoretical aims of the book as a whole,
Tushnet does not seek to interpret this thin Constitution. He does
not tell us what this Constitution is or how we should interpret it.
The process of fleshing out the basic skeleton of the thin Constitu-
tion is presumably a political task for the people.127 Nonetheless, it
is easy to imagine future constitutional theorists, perhaps Tushnet
himself, returning to this interpretive task and offering guidance
and advice on how political actors should interpret the Constitution
and, indeed, on what the Constitution really means. Unavoidably,
moral philosophy will rush back into that new interpretive project.
For now, however, Tushnet focuses on questions of constitutional
design rather than of particular substantive content. Most of
contemporary constitutional theory emphasizes the philosophical
question of the appropriate limits to political power and consequent
scope of individual rights and the judicial enforcement of that
boundary. By contrast, Tushnet's analysis focuses on the operation
of the institutions that must exercise political power. Despite
Tushnet's rejection of the thick Constitution as highly mutable, 21
his theoretical concerns are largely structural-in a political, rather
than an interpretive, sense. His analysis is Madisonian in its
emphasis on practical consequences and significance of checks and
balances, divided powers, and patterns of electoral representation. 9
Such an approach is critical not only for evaluating the influence of
the institution ofjudicial review on the actions of the other branches
of government, but also for considering the determinants of
substantive political decisions. Is judicial review really necessary to
the healthy functioning of the political system? Does the judiciary's
activity indicate that it is actually altering the course of political
outcomes, or does it merely obscure the workings of more fundamen-
tal political dynamics?
Tushnet's approach is also a significant advancement in its effort
to incorporate political incentives into constitutional theory.30 Such
126. See id. at 12 ("[O]rdinary people could be committed to the thin Constitution in ways
they could never be committed to the thick Constitution.").
127. See id. at 14 (arguing that "disagreements over the thin Constitution's meaning are
best condacted by the people, in the ordinary venues for political discussion").
128. See id. at 9.
129. See, e.g., id. at 96-123.
130. See id. at 95-128 (discussing the incentive-compatible Constitution).
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efforts will be essential to integrating an empirical analysis of the
actual operation of the constitutional system into constitutional
theory. Wechslerian constitutional theory has posited a judiciary
removed from politics, as well as a political system largely incapable
of preserving constitutional values absent judicial intervention. The
judiciary cannot be understood as operating outside of any political
context. The Court is responsive to and constrained by the larger
political environment. If constitutional values are to be preserved,
they must be preserved within the operation of the constitutional
system as a whole and not through the deus ex machina of an
idealized judicial review. The Constitution must ultimately be
"incentive-compatible" or "self-enforcing," for there is no force
external to politics that is capable of enforcing its terms. 131 In one of
the strongest chapters in the book, Tushnet provides a very
interesting exploration of the concept of an incentive-compatible
Constitution and how it might be applied to the American context. 32
As he notes, "[i]ncentive-compatibility arguments may inevitably
rest on empirical judgments that are both contentious and change-
able." 33 To be operative at all, the Constitution must in some sense
be incentive-compatible-those who must live within the Constitu-
tion must have incentives to maintain rather than subvert it. The
operation of those political incentives is likely to change over time,
however. The political supports for decentralized federalism, for
example, were largely washed away in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, and the shape of the American federal system
was transformed as a consequence.3 4 Likewise, as a result of
demographic trends, the slave-holding states gradually lost electoral
influence in the antebellum Congress, weakening the constitutional
security of slavery until the national commitment to the protection
of slave property was no longer credible, and the Union itself
collapsed. 3 ' The constitutional system is fluid.
Recognizing the importance of political incentives, however, need
not exclude values from the realm of politics and constitutionalism.
As Tushnet usefully points out, we can have "a value-based rather
131. See id. at 95.
132. See id. at 95-128.
133. Id. at 99.
134. See Keith E. Whittington, Dismantling the Modern State? The Changing Structural
Foundations of Federalism, 25 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 483, 483-88 (1998).
135. See MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL
(forthcoming) (on file with author); Barry R. Weingast, Political Stability and Civil War:
Institutions, Commitment, and American Democracy, in ANALYTIC NARRATIVES 148 (Robert
H. Bates et al. eds., 1998).
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than a structure-based account of self-enforcing constitutional
provisions."'36 Political actors, including voters, are part of an
ongoing constitutional culture. They take constitutional values
seriously, and thus often refrain from abusing the powers with
which they have been entrusted.'37 This insight could be used simply
to legitimate a preaching normative constitutional theory, ostensibly
intended to shape and refine our substantive constitutional values.
More interestingly, it suggests the need for constitutional scholars
to explore what actual values motivate political actors, how they are
formed, how they change, and how they are effectuated in political
practice. Ultimately, it may be that constitutional culture that is
most important to ensuring both individual rights and political
justice. 3 8
D. Beyond 'Advocacy Scholarship"
139
In reviewing John Rawls's recent work, and, by implication,
political philosophy more generally, Jeremy Waldron observed that
Rawls cannot simply confront disagreements about justice as a
spectator-carefully noting the diversity of views, the extent of
disagreement, etc. For he is a theorist ofjustice. He engages in these
kinds of disagreements as a participant, and as an uncompromising
opponent of conceptions other than his own....
... He is simply claiming truth for his theory and the falsity of any
theory that contradicts it. 4'
Waldron finds this to be an acceptable way of thinking about justice,
but an unproductive way to think about the "politics of justice":'
Now I can certainly think about politics without ceasing to be the
partisan of a particular conception of justice competing uncompro-
misingly with its rivals in the political arena. But I cannot do so if my
thinking about political and constitutional procedure is conducted
entirely in the shadow of my substantive convictions. 42
136. TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 107.
137. See id. at 311.
138. See WALDRON, supra note 100, at 309-12.
139. Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of
Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109 (1981).
140. WALDRON, supra note 100, at 159.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 160.
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To think about politics, as opposed to thinking about justice, "I must
be willing to address, in a relatively impartial way, the question of
what is to be done about the fact that people like me disagree with
others in society about justice."43
The same might be said of contemporary constitutional theory.
Wechslerian constitutional theory emerged out of a law school
tradition in which constitutional scholars considered themselves to
be advocates, if not shadow justices, before ajudicial audience.' As
Paul Brest concluded two decades ago, most constitutional theory is
"advocacy scholarship-amicus briefs ultimately designed to
persuade the Court to adopt our various notions of the public
good." 45 One might well question the likely quality of scholarship
that takes this starkly partisan form, but, less contentiously, one
can at least note the limitations inherent in such an approach to
constitutional theory. Advocacy scholarship faces "an inevitable
dead end."46 Such "constitutional theory has no power to command
agreement from people not already predisposed to accept the
theorist's policy prescriptions."'47 Despite the continuing disagree-
ment among theorists, the theories themselves are cast as prescrip-
tions for judicial action. As a consequence, constitutional theory
necessarily takes on a rather authoritarian cast, perhaps reinforcing
the perceived "counter-majoritarian difficulty" of judicial review.
Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts also has a norma-
tive, perhaps even utopian, quality. 4 ' Even so, Tushnet is less
concerned with debating the substance of constitutional meaning as
a participant than with examining constitutional politics as an
interested observer. He recognizes that politics involve making
decisions regarding contested values.'49 He challenges us to consider
who should be making those choices and under what circumstances,
and not merely what those choices should be. 50 The drafting of the
143. Id.
144. Tushnet has noted the legal process scholars of the 1950s and 1960s felt that audience
more acutely than have more recent constitutional scholars. See Mark Tushnet & Timothy
Lynch, The Project of the Harvard Forewords: A Social and Intellectual Inquiry, 11 CONST.
COMMENTARY 463, 490 (1994-1995).
145. Brest, supra note 139, at 1109.
146. Griffin, supra note 28, at 538.
147. Posner, supra note 41, at 3.
148. See Robert Post, Lani Guinier, Joseph Biden, and the Vocation of Legal Scholarship,
11 CONST. COMMENTARY 185, 189-90 (1994).




Constitution did not preclude later constitutional choices; it
structured how those decisions would be made. I would have
preferred Tushnet to note more emphatically the controversial
character of those continuing constitutional choices. His notion of
the thin Constitution obscures, perhaps inadvertently, the disagree-
ments that continue to exist over the content of even those most
basic of constitutional commitments. After all, it is less "the
Constitution" that we would be taking away from the courts than a
specific set of constitutional decisions, less the "constitutional law"
whose "narrative" unites us "as a people" than the constitutional
disagreements that also divide us.' The book is nonetheless
important because it focuses on how those inevitable disagreements
might be resolved or overcome, rather than offering another
argument for why there really should be no disagreements. 2
Moving beyond advocacy opens up a number of important issues
to constitutional theory. A theory oriented to constitutionalism
outside the judicial context may be more likely to address problems
of constitutional and political authority, for example. To be sure,
Wechslerian constitutional theory was deeply concerned with the
question of judicial legitimacy, with the answer usually involving
some variation on the claim that only the Court would behave
rationally in addressing some particular constitutional problem.' 5
Addressing the reality of genuine constitutional disagreements
outside the privileged context of judicial decisions-where both
constitutional and judicial authority are taken as givens-forces us
to think more seriously about why particular constitutional and
political decisions should be regarded as authoritative for those who
disagree with their substance.
Considering the Constitution outside the courts should also lead
us away from the constitutional law paradigm. In this work,
Tushnet continues to talk about "doing constitutional law outside
the courts," "' but the new institutional context is likely to empha-
size the ways in which the Constitution serves as something other
than a source of law. Legislators, for example, are faced with many
circumstances in which the Constitution may provide guidance but
does not provide rules. In such situations, we may need a theory of
151. Id. at 182. For an examination of how one such dispute eventually created two
peoples, rather than one, see MARKE. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD (1998).
152. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 177-94.
153. See KEITH E. WHITTNGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1999).
154. TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 33.
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constitutional ethics to supplement our theories of constitutional
law. 15 Along these lines, Tushnet's consideration of "the Mitchell
problem" for Senate confirmations led him to raise squarely the
question of what it means to be constitutionally conscientious, an
issue that does not often arise in judicially centered constitutional
theory.156 Moreover, the constitutional law rendered by judges has
traditionally been concerned with the Constitution as a system of
restraints on political action. But the Constitution empowers as well
as constrains, and nonjudicial actors tend to be faced more directly
with the problem of how constitutional powers are to be used in an
appropriate and responsible manner. 5 ' Likewise, we will want to
examine the process by which the Constitution helps to constitute
us as a people. Understanding the narrative uses of the Constitution
and the ways that the Constitution enters into our political and
social narratives will require examining the Constitution as a
cultural artifact rather than as a source of law. 5 '
III. CONSTITUTIONALISM, THROUGH THICK AND THIN?
As these remarks indicate, I find Taking the Constitution Away
from the Courts to be most useful as a model for a different sort of
constitutional theory, rather than as an attack on judicial review. In
this fascinating book, Tushnet does not really offer an extended
argument against judicial review. His critique is surprisingly
cautious. How bad would it really be if we abandoned this practice
ofjudicial review? Would we not wind up in largely the same place?
Do we not lose a little something-some of the constitutive aspect of
citizenship-when we rely so heavily on the Court to do our constitu-
tional thinking for us?'59 These are important and interesting
questions, but they are unlikely to persuade us to abandon such an
entrenched political institution. What Tushnet offers is less a brief
for ending the tyranny of the judiciary, than a series of meditations
on the constitutional world outside the courts. I found those
meditations to be provocative, insightful, and productive. Tushnet
155. See Keith E. Whittington, On the Need for a Theory of Constitutional Ethics, GOOD
SOCIETY 9 (forthcoming 2000).
156. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 51.
157. See WHITTiNGTON, supra note 81, at 2; Keith E. Whittington, The Road Not Taken:
Dred Scott, Judicial Authority, and Political Questions, (Nov. 18, 1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
158. For a pioneering effort in this regard, see MICHAEL KAMMEN, AMACHINE THATWOULD
GO OF ITSELF (1986).
159. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 154.
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takes off in a new direction and invites constitutional theory to come
along. I would hope that a significant number of us will take him up
on the invitation.
I was less struck by the disagreements I had with the arguments
in the book than by the doubts and questions that I was left with
about the constitutional vision that Tushnet sketches within its
pages. I have little doubt that constitutional deliberation and
activity can and do take place outside the courts, that the courts are
substantially more constrained in their desire and ability to alter
political outcomes than the mythology of the Warren Court would
suggest, and that the judiciary is a somewhat problematic guardian
of our constitutional heritage. I am rather less certain about the
contours and desirability of Tushnet's "populist constitutional law."
A. Is the Thin Constitution Still a Law?
Despite his populism and his skepticism about the details and
longevity of the thick Constitution, Tushnet is still committed to the
notion of constitutional law and a Constitution that operates on the
legal model. The responsibility for interpreting and enforcing the
populist constitutional law will be expanded beyond the narrow
confines of the judiciary to include all participants in the political
process, but the Constitution is still available to be interpreted and
is still intended to be binding on political actors. 6 ° My uncertainty
derives from the thinness of Tushnet's authoritative Constitution.
The thin Constitution is quite thin. Tushnet explains that the thin
Constitution consists of the "fundamental guarantees of equality,
freedom of expression, and liberty."' 6 ' Populist constitutional law is
"a law oriented to realizing the principles of the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution's Preamble. More specifically, it
is a law committed to the principle of universal human rights
justifiable by reason in the service of self-government."'62 "[T]he
principle that all people were created equal, the principle that all
had inalienable rights. This is the thin Constitution."'63 Those are
good principles, and most Americans would find it hard to argue
160. See id. at 186 ("Populist constitutional law returns constitutional law to the people,
acting through politics.").
161. Id. at 11.
162. Id. at 181 (citation omitted).
163. Id. at 11.
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with them-and that is part of the point. They constitute us, as
Americans, and they define who we are as a people. But is that a
law, and what does Tushnet mean by calling this a law?
The Founders certainly did not think that the vague principles
articulated in the first few lines of the Declaration of Independence
and the Preamble themselves could serve as a Constitution. The rest
of the constitutional text, the "thick Constitution," was not merely
a potentially fallible device to vindicate those principles; it was the
Constitution. The Preamble laid out the goals of the new political
nation.'64 The Constitution laid out the means for realizing those
goals. The Declaration of Independence may have constituted us as
a nation-though prior to the Civil War that would have been a
highly contested claim-but it did not constitute a government.
Tushnet seems so concerned with the process of ideological nation-
building and citizenship that he loses track of the actual structures
of governance.
In concluding his discussion of the "Saxbe fix" and the "Mitchell
problem," Tushnet contends that the notion of a thin Constitution
"shows why a Senator who disregards the Emoluments Clause is not
acting in a way inconsistent with the rule of law .... The Senator
... would be doing what the law requires-what is consistent with
the thin Constitution even though it is inconsistent with the
Emoluments Clause."'65 I have difficulty seeing this as doing what
the law requires. I am skeptical of the idea that a senator may,
consistent with the law, disregard the Emoluments Clause while
operating within the interpretive context of an existent constitution.
If nothing else, it seems insufficiently populist for senators to
imagine that they are authorized to ignore the rules governing their
office. More to the immediate point, I am uncertain how the
principles of the Declaration of Independence can really serve as a
law in this context. The purpose of law is to settle disputes. A text
is hardly functioning as law if it does not have fairly thick substan-
tive content that can specify determinate answers to controversial
questions. The very general principles of the thin Constitution
would not seem to satisfy that requirement. Such a law adds little
to our ability to resolve contested matters in American politics. To
that extent, the Declaration of Independence has been so successful
in constituting us as a nation that it is no longer relevant to the
164. See U.S. CONST. preamble.
165. TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 52.
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normal course of our internal politics. Any number of possible
political actions and arrangements are consistent with the princi-
ples of the Declaration of Independence. Tushnet's hypothetical
senator may be doing what the (thin constitutional) law allows, but
so would the other senators who would adhere to the Emoluments
Clause.
A law with so little substantive content is no law at all. To voice
an objection that Tushnet anticipates, but does not really answer,
this reduces constitutional interpretation to little more than moral
philosophy.16 6 There are ways of making this Constitution a bit more
constraining. The thin Constitution may be a source of law, rather
than a law itself. The law in Tushnet's constitutional system comes
from the "populist constitutional law" laid down by the political
actors inspired by the Constitution. Perhaps by "populist constitu-
tional law," Tushnet has something like the Civil Rights Act of 1964
in mind-a substantive legal directive that bears some derivative
connection to the principles of the thin Constitution.167 Perhaps less
formally, he has in mind our various national traditions-our state
and federal laws, our private social practices, our public speeches,
our literary texts-that provide a more substantive spin on the
general principles laid out in the Declaration of Independence and
help distinguish what we Americans mean by "promoting the
general welfare" 6 ' from what those Hungarians mean. Or he could
simply smuggle a whole philosophical system under the guise of a
"thin" Constitution. It would not be the first time that a putatively
"thin" political theory turned out to be thick with substantive, and
contestable, philosophical assumptions. 6 9 Tushnet starts to play
this game when he asserts that "Governor Faubus could not
plausibly have claimed that his actions advanced the Declaration's
project. The most he could establish was that he was acting on
behalf of states' rights.. . .""0 In the first instance, we might note
that an appeal to "states' rights" draws upon particular conceptions
166. See id.
167. See id. at 168-69 ("Law professor Ira Lupa calls such laws 'statutes revolving in
constitutional orbits.-).
168. U.S. CONST. preamble.
169. See WALDRON, supra note 100, at 147-208; William A. Galston,DefendingLiberalism,
76 Ai. POL. SCI. REv. 621, 625-29 (1983); R.M. Hare, Critical Studies on Rawls' Theory of
Justice, in READING RAWLs 81 (Norman Daniels ed., 1975).
170. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 14. Given Faubus's status as a constitutional thinker,
he shows up surprisingly often in this book. See id. at 238. With eleven references noted in
the index, Faubus easily surpasses Frederick Douglass, Andrew Jackson, Martin Luther
King, and John Marshall combined. See id.
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of democracy and community, as well as upon the specific structures
of the original thick Constitution. More generally, though Faubus
himself may not have had a liberal principle on which to stand, the
theory of racial segregation, if not this particular practice, could be
regarded as consistent with the basic principles of the thin Constitu-
tion. Indeed, the attorneys who defended southern segregation made
exactly those arguments, and Wechsler was troubled by their
plausibility.'' We may not find segregation to be a very compelling
constitutional vision, but Tushnet makes his task too easy by simply
dismissing even the segregationists as irrational.'72
Such efforts to give substantive content to the thin Constitu-
tion-to make it into something that can serve as a law-lead us back
to the (or, in any case, a) thick Constitution. The particular
Constitution that the Founders drafted is, of course, not the only
constitution that would be consistent with the principles of the
Declaration of Independence. There are other imaginable texts that
could also "promote the general Welfare" and "establish Justice." 7 '
If we were free to ignore this thick Constitution because we could
imagine other thick constitutions that would also be consistent with
the principles of democracy and liberty, then we would be very free
indeed.
Judicial review does not appear to be Tushnet's real target in this
book. His real target appears to be the idea of a written
constitution. 7 a I have argued elsewhere that judicial review is
implicated in the choice to have a written constitution, but a nation
may have a written constitution without having judicial review."'
John Marshall and Marbury17 6 notwithstanding, Congress may still
be bound by the Constitution even if it, rather than the Supreme
Court, has final responsibility for interpreting its terms. The written
Constitution has determinate and interpretable content, regardless
of who does the interpreting. We can lay aside judicial review
without laying aside the terms of the written Constitution. But
Tushnet specifically wants to be able to lay aside the terms of the
written Constitution, not because they are particularly flawed, but
simply because they could be or could become worse than some
171. See Wechsler, supra note 25, at 26-35.
172. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 8.
173. U.S. CONST. preamble.
174. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 39-42.
175. See WHITTINGTON, supra note 153, at 47-61.
176. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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imaginable alternative. This may be a defensible position. One can
certainly argue, and some have, that the Constitution as written has
made little difference to American freedoms and democracy. I just
wish that Tushnet had been more direct in his argument and
written more systematically about the virtues of living under an
unwritten constitution in the British style, rather than mingling
that quite distinct argument with arguments over judicial suprem-
acy and judicial review.
B. Abolishing Judicial Review-A Step Too Far?
At the end of his book, Tushnet takes the radical step of rejecting
judicial review in toto.'77 One can be sympathetic to his complaints
about the theory and practice ofjudicial review and still wonder why
this step is really necessary. One may be even more hesitant to take
that leap of faith with Tushnet given that Tushnet himself seems to
have pointed out a less radical alternative-the rejection of judicial
supremacy-and given that he does not elaborate very fully how he
expects the constitutional system to operate in the absence of
judicial review."' I find cases such as the congressional exercise of
the impeachment power to be suggestive, but hardly decisive. 9 We
might well wonder if congressmen are more cognizant of constitu-
tional values when considering an impeachment than when passing
drug crime or internet pornography legislation.
Even if Tushnet is right in his argument that judicial review
mostly amounts to "noise around zero,""' ° in this context the noise
might matter. The judiciary may well provide a safety net that is
sometimes useful. Although judges, acting by themselves, are
unlikely to be able to make radical changes in the political system,
judges do make a difference on the margin, which may be enough to
justify judicial review. Even if we do not want (and cannot expect)
an independent judiciary making basic value judgments at odds
with those of most elected officials, we may still want a separate
institution to review legislation for mistakes-constitutional defects
that were insufficiently considered by legislators in the press of
business. The courts may not save us from a political system acting
177. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 154.
178. See id. at 163-74.
179. See id. at 107.
180. Id. at 153.
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at its worst, but they may well improve the situation when Congress
has a "moderately bad day."1"' Mark Graber has identified such
error-correction as an important element of the Supreme Court's
activity in reviewing the constitutionality of federal legislation prior
to Dred Scott.'82 In granting titles to land in the western territories,
Congress sometimes impaired existing land titles.'83 In arbitrating
among these land disputes, the Court was forced to reemphasize the
constitutional limits on Congress's legislative power to alter existing
property rights, including those rooted in Congress's own prior
legislation. 4 A court system empowered with judicial review may
be a useful mechanism for monitoring legislative output and
correcting mistakes.
Somewhat differently, judicial review may provide an opportunity
for sober second thoughts.'85 Unconstitutional legislation may pass
as the result of innocent oversights on the part of a Congress whose
attention is elsewhere. Such legislation may also pass as the result
of misplaced emotion and temporary preferences. On further
reflection, many legislators may regret their initial decision. The
courts may limit the damage done by such ill-considered legislative
actions. Tushnet is not indifferent to this concern."86 He correctly
points out that judicial review may in fact encourage the passage of
such legislation by rendering it costless.' Knowing that the courts
will clean up their messes, legislators are free to act irresponsibly.
Even if the presence of judicial review encourages the passage of
some unconstitutional legislation, it is surely the case that not all
unconstitutional legislation is so induced. It is true that such
statutes are unlikely to set us "down a path at the end of which is
181. Id. at 106.
182. See Mark A. Graber, Naked Land Transfers and American Constitutional
Development, 53 VAND. L. REV. 73 (2000).
183. See id. at 91-98.
184. See id.
185. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 67; see also ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN
CONFLICT (1992).




Stalinist Russia,"'88 but we are still better than we would be in a
world without judicial review.
Legislatures and the courts have different priorities and face
different political incentives. These differences may work to our
advantage in preserving constitutional values. Tushnet notes that
both legislators and judges face incentives that prevent either from
being completely "disinterested" and that may "distort" their
judgments.8 9 The concepts of distortion and disinterest are not
adequate, however, in capturing the differences between these
institutions and how they may approach constitutional issues. We
will need a much more extensive analysis of these institutions, their
differences, and their interaction before we can reach a conclusion
about the utility of judicial review. Tushnet asserts that "judges
have only value-based incentives to respect" the Constitution's
terms, 190 but that may not make judges any less reliable in enforcing
constitutional values. The particular institutional environment of
the judiciary may serve to intensify those "value-based incentives"
and minimize distractions from the central mission of preserving
constitutional values. Judges may also feel external pressures that
may affect their actions, such as the desire to maintain a good
reputation among professional colleagues, legal academics, and
social peers, or concern for the eventual judgment of history.
Tushnet asserts that such desires in judges "may produce distor-
tions parallel to the ones that affect politicians," but too much is
packed into the words "distortions" and "parallel."'9 ' Such pressures
are different from the electoral pressures felt by legislators, for
example, and may well lead to countervailing rather than "parallel"
188. Id. at 106. Tushnet makes other, quite sophisticated points in his defense that I
cannot consider here but that I think will be central to future theorizing about the ultimate
value ofjudicial review and constitutional law generally. First, he notes that courts, as well
as Congress, can make mistakes. See id. at 107. Evaluating judicial review will require a
comparative institutional analysis that systematically considers the tendencies of both
Congress and the courts, as well as their interaction, and the types of "errors" to which each
is susceptible. See id. at 104-08, 128, 163-72. This is a difficult empirical and normative task,
and Tushnet points us in the right direction. Second, he notes the complexities involved in
distinguishing and evaluating short-term and long-term preferences, rash decisions, and
"sober second thoughts." Id. at 67. As a political community we are faced with the possibility
of conflicts among our constitutional values and reasonable disagreement over their
substantive content and particular applications. A rhetoric of constitutional "mistakes" might
well mask simple disagreement and the necessity of constitutional choices. For a more
extended consideration of this point, see WALDRON, supra note 100.
189. See TuSHNET, supra note 5, at 108.
190. Id. In this quote, Tushnet is specifically referring to "the Constitution's division of
authority between state and nation," id., but the point can be generalized.
191. Id.
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results while discouraging rather than encouraging the "distortion"
of constitutional meaning.
It seems clear that politicians have some problematic incentives
relative to maintaining constitutional values. Legislators, for
example, would prefer to avoid electorally risky behavior. Most
obviously, this may lead them to favor political majorities over
political minorities and individuals. It may also lead them to avoid
potentially risky or controversial decisions or to at least hide their
participation in such decisions. As Graber has insightfully devel-
oped, this may encourage legislators to throw some constitutional
issues to the courts to resolve.'92 Simply removing the power of
judicial review may not force legislators to be any more conscien-
tious in carrying out their responsibilities. Congress has passed a
wide variety of political hot potatoes to institutions other than the
courts in the past, including the executive bureaucracy. 9 ' Legisla-
tors use a variety of devices to minimize their accountability for
their costly decisions, from omnibus budget packages that obscure
taxing and spending decisions, to "unfunded mandates" and
conditional funds that burden the states with and implicate them in
federal policy.'94 The institutional alternatives to the judicial
involvement in constitutional decisions may be even less attractive.
Risk aversion, combined with collective action problems, may tend
to keep some constitutional issues offthe legislative agenda entirely.
Rather than encouraging more democratic and open deliberation
and decision on contested constitutional issues, the end of judicial
review may result in some constitutional concerns simply going
unaddressed. The status and number of individuals affected by a
malfunctioning criminal justice system, for example, may be
inadequate to force such concerns onto the broader political agenda,
perhaps leaving in place abusive police practices, haphazard judicial
proceedings, and antiquated contraceptive prohibitions. Reforming
such practices may only affect the margins of political life, but the
consequences for those immediately affected may be enormous.
192. See Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the
Judiciary, 7 STUD. IN AM. POL. DEv. 35, 37 (1993) ("Elected officials in the United States
encourage or tacitly support judicial policymaking both as a means of avoiding responsibility
for making tough decisions and as a means of pursuing controversial policy goals that they
cannot publicly advance through open legislative and electoral politics.").
193. See id. at 45-61.




It is also somewhat frustrating that Taking the ConstitutionAway
from the Courts is short on specifics about the precise nature of
Tushnet's proposal. Tushnet briefly notes, for example, the possibil-
ity of ultra vires doctrine in forcing Congress to make explicit, and
thus presumably more costly, its deviations from established
constitutional norms. 95 This seems like a promising path for further
exploration, but Tushnet only offers the barest gestures at its
possible outlines here. More importantly, Tushnet makes no real
effort to distinguish between the judicial review of congressional
statutes and the federal judicial review of state political actions or,
for that matter, to discuss state judiciaries except by implication.
The distinction is an old one in debates over judicial supremacy and
the scope ofjudicial review. When Judge John Gibson of Pennsylva-
nia famously voiced objections to the logic ofMarbury v. Madison in
1825, he specifically limited his concerns to the judicial review of the
coordinate branches of the national government. 96 There are legal,
institutional, and philosophical arguments against federal judicial
review of either federal or state actions, or both. Tushnet's emphasis
on the insignificance of judicial review generally, the problematic
incentives it creates for political deliberation, and the priority of the
thin over the thick Constitution would all seem to suggest that he
means to attack judicial review in all forms, regardless of the
government actions being reviewed. But as Oliver Wendell Holmes
once observed, "I do not think the United States would come to an
end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Congress void. I do
think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that
declaration as to the laws of the several States."'97 We might add a
concern for Tushnet's thin Constitution to Holmes's specific concern
with the Union. Tushnet gives no consideration to the activities of
the states' governments, either individually or collectively. Are they
as likely to adhere to constitutional values as the national govern-
ment is? Is there a need for uniformity in their local interpretations
of the principles of the Declaration of Independence? Certainly
Tushnet's claim that judicial review is marginal to political out-
comes 198 would require greater scrutiny if judicial review of state
actions, ranging from progressive reform legislation to criminal
procedures to legislative apportionment, were taken into account.
195. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 163-65.
196. See Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330, 356 (Pa. 1825).
197. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1952).
198. See TUSHNET, supra note 5, at 153, 174.
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Perhaps Tushnet is presuming an expanded congressional suprem-
acy over the states absent judicial review, but such a proposal would
also need further elaboration and defense. Once we deemphasize the
thick Constitution and its distribution of political authority to
different government entities, then greater state autonomy would
seem to be as much of an option as intensified centralization and as
consistent with the thin Constitution.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AS POLITICAL SCIENCE
About halfway through Taking the Constitution Away from the
Courts, Tushnet makes an important point that should push
constitutional theory in entirely new directions. Having questioned
whether the courts will necessarily do a better job than Congress in
preserving constitutional values, Tushnet concludes, "The real
question is which of these two imperfect ways of organizing a
government gets us closer to what we want. The case for self-
enforcement is stronger than our current legal culture thinks it
is."199 These two sentences hold the promise of a new kind of
constitutional theory, one that bears a closer relationship to political
science than to traditional legal scholarship. The "real question"
that Tushnet poses is difficult to ask within the confines of constitu-
tional theory in the Wechslerian mode. Contemporary constitutional
theory is almost exclusively concerned with substantive political
goals. Tushnet asks us to think instead about the political mecha-
nisms that would help us realize those or any goals. Contemporary
constitutional theory is primarily concerned with principled
absolutes and their vindication. Tushnet instead asks us to think
about trade-offs between imperfect arrangements. Contemporary
constitutional theory is institutionally partisan, defined by the
mission of defendingjudicial review and specifying its uses. Tushnet
asks us to take off the judicial robes and adopt the perspective of a
constitutional designer, who must evaluate different institutions
and choose between them.200 Tushnet is not alone in asking such
questions, but he is no longer operating within the paradigm
established by the "revival of grand theory in constitutional law."201
199. Id. at 108.
200. See id. at 93-128, 154-76.
201. TUSHNET, supra note 1, at 1.
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Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts represents a
genuinely interdisciplinary constitutional theory, though one whose
heart may be closer to political science than to traditional legal
scholarship. It calls for a normative and empirical theory that is
concerned with comparative institutional analysis and the actual
operation of political systems. It suggests the need for a historical
and interpretive theory that is concerned with how the Constitution
operates outside of the courts and what the Constitution has come
to mean to those not mired in judicial doctrine. It emphasizes that
many of the assumptions of traditional constitutional theory are
deeply problematic and should be held up to analysis rather than
asserted as axioms. This is an extremely useful project, and Tushnet
has offered a fine example of how it can be done.

